Searle’s Solution to the Missing Object Problem :: Searle Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Let us imagine that to play a joke on her new friend Suzy, Jenny tells her all about her fumble spaniel. Jenny tells Suzy that her dogs name is Sally, that Sally has long blonde hair, and that she loves to eat dodge scraps. The only problem is that Sally does not truly exist but Jenny doesnt tell this to Suzy. Because of this, Suzy forms all sorts of beliefs about Jennys cocker spaniel. She believes that it is named Sally, that it has long blonde hair and loves to eat table scraps, and perhaps a few other beliefs. She also forms desires regarding the dog she wants to meet Sally, to play fetch with her, and to buy her a doggie treat. Suzy, therefore, has many beliefs and desires regarding Sally the cocker spaniel and all of this in spite of the fact that Sally does not really exist at all. In orchestrating this prank, Jenny thought she was merely playing a simple trick on her friend. But in succeeding at this, she has brought about a significant philosophical dilemma. If Sally the cocker spaniel does not exist, because what atomic number 18 all of Suzys beliefs and desires about? This is the problem of objectless directedness. Mental states like believing and desiring are understood to be directed at things they are knowledgeable states, and every intentional state must have an intentional object. If I have a belief that Michael Jordan is the best basketball player of all time, or that Bush is a good wartime President, then these are beliefs about, respectively, Michael Jordan and George Bush. If I have a desire to meet the Pope, or to have a hamburger, then these desires are directed at the Pope and a hamburger, respectively. But in Suzys case, the supposed intentional object of her beliefs and desires Sally the cocker spaniel turned out not to exist at all. So did the beliefs and desires have an intentional object at all? And if so, what was it? In addressing this problem, this paper will explicate and argue for a ascendent given by John Searle in his book, Intentionality. After briefly